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Models of competition for the market with endogenous market structures show that, contrary to the
Arrow view, an endogenous entry threat induces the average ﬁrm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent
leader to invest more. We test these predictions using a unique dataset for the German manufacturing sec-
tor (the Mannheim Innovation Panel). In line with our predictions, endogenous entry threats as perceived
by the ﬁrms (in survey data) reduce R&D intensity for an average ﬁrm, but they increase it for an incum-
bent leader. These results hold after a number of robustness tests with instrumental variable regressions.
INTRODUCTION
There is a lot of debate on the role of market leaders in investing in R&D and promoting
technological progress. A commonly held view is that ﬁrms invest more in a more com-
petitive market where the entry pressure is stronger, and incumbents tend to be less inno-
vative than their followers, so that the persistence of their dominance is typically the
signal of market power and of the lack of entry pressure. This view is often associated
with Arrow (1962), who has shown that incumbents have lower incentives to invest in
R&D than outsiders, and that in case of free entry in competition for the market they do
not invest at all, leaving innovative activity to the outsiders. We adopt a Schumpeterian
perspective and challenge this view from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective,
showing under which conditions incumbent leaders do invest more than other ﬁrms, and
providing empirical evidence in support of our thesis.
There are few competing explanations for innovation by incumbents in Schumpeteri-
an models. The simplest one, due to Segerstrom (2007), relies on the fact that incumbents
may have a technological advantage in the R&D activity. This assumption may be
realistic in certain sectors and allows one to study monopoly persistence, but it is basi-
cally equivalent to assuming the solution of the Arrow paradox rather than solving it.1
Acemoglu (2009, ch. 14) and Acemoglu and Cao (2010) have proposed a diﬀerent ratio-
nale for innovation by incumbents. This may be due to the fact that only incumbents can
invest in incremental innovations (because outsiders would infringe their patents through
small improvements), while entrants invest in more radical innovations. In such a way,
both incumbents and outsiders invest, and growth depends on their rates of investment.
This is a plausible mechanism, but it explains why incumbents may invest in small
improvements of their own technologies, which is a trivial activity, and not why they may
directly compete against outsiders to obtain radical innovations, which is the key issue.
The alternative explanation for innovation by incumbents that we embrace in this
work does not rely on technological advantages or exogenous market structures, but is
based on a pure strategic advantage of the incumbents in patent races with endogenous
market structures. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) were the ﬁrst to show that in a deter-
ministic contest (an auction for patents), an incumbent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to invest just
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enough to deter any investment by any outsider. However, this is not necessarily the
case in the presence of a more realistic contest under uncertainty with barriers to entry.
We show that in such a contest, an incumbent leader does not usually deter entry, but
always ﬁnds it proﬁtable to invest more than any outsider as long as entry is endo-
genous. The model is in the tradition of the recent works on endogenous market struc-
tures and market leadership,2 and shows the crucial role of entry pressure on the
diﬀerent behaviour of leaders and followers. First, we show that an increase in the
number of investors reduces proﬁtability and therefore the investment of each ﬁrm:
therefore the endogenous entry threat tends to reduce the R&D intensity of each ﬁrm.
Moreover, in a symmetric contest, an incumbent monopolist has lower incentives to
invest in R&D because in case of innovation it replaces itself: this is the Arrow eﬀect,
which leads to zero investment by the incumbent in case of endogenous entry. Then we
show that the outcome changes radically when the incumbent is also the leader of the
contest for the innovation, which is often reasonable because of its strategic advantage
in the market. The incumbent leader exploits its ﬁrst mover advantage to invest more
than the other ﬁrms. The intuition has to do with the impact of its investment on entry:
a small investment attracts large entry and makes it likely that another ﬁrm will replace
the incumbent, while a commitment to a large investment has the double advantage of
reducing entry and increasing the chances of an innovation.3 We also show that these
theoretical results are robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations; in particular, they hold
in general patent races (see Etro, 2004, 2008) and in models of preliminary investment
in cost reducing R&D as a strategic commitment for the competition in the market (see
Etro 2006).4
We bring to the data the two basic predictions of our theoretical investigations: the
R&D intensity of the average ﬁrm is lower when there is an endogenous entry threat, and
the R&D intensity of the incumbent leader is larger than that of the average ﬁrm when
there is an endogenous entry threat.5 We test these hypotheses through a Tobit model for
R&D intensity. Our empirical investigation is based on a unique dataset on the German
manufacturing sector, the Mannheim Innovation Survey from 2005 conducted by the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), which includes a wide number of ﬁrm-
level data with a special focus on innovation. The main problem in testing hypotheses
concerning market structures is that the deﬁnitions of markets, their leaders and entry
conditions are usually based on statistical indexes (for instance on market concentration
and dominance) with limited explanatory power, or on discretionary evaluations by
external observers (for instance on who is the leader in the relevant market). A novel
aspect of our empirical approach is the fact that the same ﬁrms provide a subjective view
on the market in which they operate and its leadership, on the entry conditions and on
the key determinants of R&D intensity. Rather than determining arbitrarily the size and
composition of a market, assigning a degree of entry intensity in a discretionary way and
assigning a status of leadership on the basis of possibly arbitrary assumptions, using the
survey results we allow the ﬁrms to identify the size of their main market, the existence of
an endogenous threat of entry in the market and the identity of the leader in the market.
We also perform robustness tests concerning the potential reverse causality between
R&D and entry threats using IV regressions and a number of exogeneity tests. Our main
predictions are strongly supported by the empirical evidence: entry pressure reduces the
average investment per ﬁrm, but incumbent leaders invest more than other ﬁrms when
there is the pressure of a strong threat of entry.
These results can be interpreted as a ﬁrst attempt to test the main predictions of the
endogenous market structures approach, which analyses the role of ﬁrms in markets
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where entry is endogenous. In this case, the behaviour of incumbent leaders is radically
diﬀerent depending on the entry conditions, and the conclusions of the cited approach
appear to be conﬁrmed empirically. At a policy level, the results suggest also that we may
have to change our way of looking at persistent dominance in technologically advanced
markets: this may be the result of strong competitive pressures rather than of market
power, at least in those markets in which there are no barriers to innovation for the out-
siders.
The article is organized as follows: Section I describes the theoretical model and
derives the empirical prediction, Section II provides the empirical evidence and Section
III concludes.
I. A MODEL OF R&D INVESTMENT
The aim of this section is to provide theoretical motivation for our testable predictions.
With this purpose in mind, we ﬁrst develop the simplest model that leads to our main
results, and then sketch other theoretical frameworks that support the same predictions.
Let us consider a simple contest between n ﬁrms to obtain a drastic innovation that
provides a ﬂow of proﬁts V for the winner and generates no gains for the losers.6 Each
contestant i bears ﬁxed costs F and invests a fraction of its revenues in R&D. The cost of
investment is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of the R&D/sales ratio
zi ∈ [0,1], and is normalized to generate a probability of innovation zi. More precisely,
we assume that the cost of the R&D activity is quadratic, that is, dz2i =2, where the con-
stant d parametrizes the marginal cost of investing in R&D.7 We can think of the ﬁxed
cost as the investment necessary to be engaged in R&D activity (e.g. build a laboratory),
and of the rate of investment as related to the variable cost (e.g. allocating researchers
and capital to the laboratory). To focus on interesting cases, we assume F < d/2 and
V 2 ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2dFp ; dÞ: these assumptions guarantee that at least one ﬁrm invests a part of its rev-
enues in R&D.
If multiple ﬁrms innovate at the same time, then competition in the market drives
their proﬁts to zero, therefore the contest has a winner only in the case of a single innova-
tor. Summing up, the expected proﬁt function of a generic contestant i is
Pi ¼ zi
Yn
j¼1; j 6¼i
ð1 zjÞV
dz2i
2
þ F
 
;
where the ﬁrst term is the expected gain from innovating, and the second term is the cost
of the R&D investment. The probability of winning the contest for ﬁrm i is the probabil-
ity of innovating zi multiplied by the probability that no other ﬁrm (including the incum-
bent) innovates,∏j 6¼i(1zj). With this probability, the contestant obtains the award V.
Entry in the contest
In this subsection we evaluate the impact of entry on the investment level of each ﬁrm
engaged in the contest in a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Let us start from the case in
which the number of ﬁrms n is exogenous. The ﬁrst-order condition for the investment of
each ﬁrm can be written as follows in a symmetric equilibrium:
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z ¼ ð1 zÞ
n1V
d
:ð1Þ
Notice that a monopolist would invest z = V/d < 1 under our regularity assumptions.
Total diﬀerentiation of the equilibrium condition provides
dz
dn
¼  zð1 zÞ logð1=ð1 zÞÞ
1þ ðn 2Þz \0:
More ﬁrms imply a lower rate of investment for each ﬁrm (though aggregate invest-
ment may increase, of course). Moreover, the rate of investment of each ﬁrm is increas-
ing in the value of the innovation V and decreasing in the marginal cost of the
investment (in d).
Since entry reduces the expected gross proﬁts,8 we can immediately characterize the
endogenous market structure. Firms enter until the following zero proﬁt condition holds:
zð1 zÞn1V ¼ dz
2
2
þ F:ð2Þ
Combining (1) with (2) and solving for z, when the number of ﬁrms is high enough to dis-
sipate all proﬁts, the investment of each entrant is
z ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r
:
If we substitute this equilibrium investment in (2), take logs and solve for n, then we
obtain the endogenous number of ﬁrms:
n ¼ 1þ logðV=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p Þ
log½1=ð1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2F=dp Þ :ð3Þ
To exclude the case of a natural monopoly and insure that n ≥ 2, we adopt the addi-
tional assumption V [
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p
=ð1  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2F=dp Þ. The endogenous market structure depends
on technological conditions and on the value of the innovation. First, an increase in the
value of the innovation V, which may be due to stronger intellectual property rights or a
larger market size, increases the number of investors, even if this happens in a less than
proportional way—see (3). The reason is that a larger gain from innovating attracts more
ﬁrms but strengthens rivalry between them so as to reduce the rate of future entry. At the
same time, notice that the investment of each ﬁrm is now independent of the size of the
innovation: total R&D in the market increases through an increase in the number of
investors only. Second, an increase in the ﬁxed cost F reduces entry, which in turn allows
a smaller number of ﬁrms to invest more and expect larger gross revenues to cover the lar-
ger ﬁxed costs.9 Finally, a larger marginal cost of the R&D investment d has a negative
impact on the investment of each ﬁrm. We can think of the marginal cost of investment
as an inverse function of the human resources of the ﬁrm: a larger pool of workers
reduces the marginal cost of research and therefore corresponds to a lower d. Accord-
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ingly, the equilibrium investment is increasing in the size of the ﬁrm’s labour force and is
increasing in a less than proportional way.
For our purposes, it is important to summarize the reaction of the rate of investment
z when the number of ﬁrms increases from one to the maximum number of ﬁrms that is
consistent with non-negative proﬁts, that is, the endogenous number of ﬁrms: R&D
investment decreases with entry and is minimal with endogenous entry. Finally, one can
show that the equilibrium tends to be associated with excess entry and a suboptimal rate
of investment; in particular, if the social value of the innovation is the same as its private
value V, then the optimal allocation of resources requires a lower number of ﬁrms invest-
ing more (relative to the equilibrium).10
The role of incumbents
We now study innovation in markets where there is an incumbent ﬁrm that is the current
monopolist in the market (for instance because of a patent on the existing leading tech-
nology). This incumbent maintains its proﬁts p > 0 in case no one innovates. Therefore
the expected proﬁts of the incumbent are
PI ¼ zI
Yn
j6¼I
½1 zjVþ ð1 zIÞ
Yn
j6¼I
½1 zjp
dz2I
2
 F;
where the index I stands for incumbent. The proﬁts of the outsiders remain the same as
before. As noticed by Arrow (1962), the incentives of the incumbent to invest are lower
than for the outsiders. To verify this, we will consider a Nash equilibrium in the choice of
R&D investment between the incumbent and the outsiders, distinguishing between the
case with no entry pressure, that is, with a ﬁxed number of outsiders, and the case with
endogenous entry pressure.
First, assume no entry pressure. With a ﬁxed number of outsiders n, the equilibrium
ﬁrst-order conditions for the incumbent and the outsiders are
zI ¼
ð1 zÞn1ðV pÞ
d
and z ¼ ð1 zÞ
n2ð1 zIÞV
d
;
which provides zI < z: outsiders always invest more than the incumbent as long as
p > 0. This leads also to lower proﬁts from the contest for the incumbent compared to
the outsiders.
Now consider endogenous entry pressure. Under free entry, the number of ﬁrms
increases until the expected proﬁts of the outsiders are zero. As a consequence, the incum-
bent is better oﬀ withdrawing from the contest and invests zero: this is the traditional
Arrow (1962) eﬀect in action.
The role of incumbent leaders
When the incumbent has a ﬁrst mover advantage and can choose its investment before
the entry of the outsiders (i.e. is an incumbent leader), the incentives to invest are radi-
cally changed. We will now examine this case, ﬁrst when the number of outsiders is exo-
genous, and then when it is endogenous.
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No entry pressure
Consider a Stackelberg equilibrium between an incumbent and a ﬁxed number of out-
siders n. In this case, there would be two eﬀects to determine the size of the investment
of the incumbent leader. On one side, the Arrow eﬀect would lead to a lower invest-
ment compared to the followers because the incumbent leader would have less to gain
from innovating. On the other side, we would have a Stackelberg eﬀect, which works in
the opposite direction in this framework characterized by strategic substitutability. In
general, incumbent leaders may invest more, less or approximately the same as the out-
siders in markets where the number of ﬁrms is given. Nevertheless, as long as p is high
enough, the ﬁrst eﬀect would prevail and the incumbent leader would invest less than
the average follower. For instance, with d = 1 and n = 2, in case of interior solutions,
we have
z ¼ Vpþ ð1 VÞV V
3
1 2VðV pÞ and zIL ¼
Vpþ ð1 VÞðV pÞ
1 2VðV pÞ ;
where the index IL stands for incumbent leader. The Arrow eﬀect prevails on the Stackel-
berg eﬀect whenever p > V3/(1  V).11
Endogenous entry pressure
Now let us consider a Stackelberg game with endogenous entry where the incumbent is
leader in the choice of its investment zIL. Then entry occurs, and ﬁnally all the outsiders
simultaneously choose their investment.
Let us start from the last stage to characterize the equilibrium investment of the out-
siders for a given number n and a given investment by the incumbent zIL. The ﬁrst-order
conditions can be written as follows in a symmetric equilibrium:
z ¼ ð1 zÞ
n2ð1 zILÞV
d
:ð4Þ
Again, R&D investment per ﬁrm is a decreasing function of the number of ﬁrms. In the
second stage, ﬁrms enter until the following zero proﬁt condition holds:
zð1 zÞn2ð1 zILÞV ¼
dz2
2
þ F:
Combining these two equations, the rate of investment of each entrant becomes
z ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r
;ð5Þ
which is exactly the same as before: the presence of a leader does not aﬀect what the other
active ﬁrms do. If we substitute this equilibrium investment in (4), take logs and solve for
n, we obtain the endogenous number of outsiders as a function of the investment of the
incumbent:
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nðzILÞ ¼ 2þ
log½ð1 zILÞV=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p 
log½1=ð1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2F=dp Þ :ð6Þ
Clearly this number is at least 2 if zIL is small enough. More precisely, since n(zIL) = 2
requires log [(1  zIL)V/dz] = 0, entry occurs if zIL\ 1 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p
=V. Notice that in case
of small ﬁxed costs, say close to zero, the equilibrium rate of investment (5) is close to 0,
and the entry deterring rate of investment is close to 1: in such a case, entry deterrence is
a very costly strategy. In this case, R&D intensity is still reduced by entry.
We now turn to the behaviour of the incumbent leader in the ﬁrst stage. As long
as the investment of the leader zIL is small enough to allow entry of some followers,
each one of the followers invests as in (5), and the number of ﬁrms is given by (6).
The incumbent leader can choose zIL 2 ð0; 1 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p
=VÞ to maximize the expected
proﬁts:
PI ¼ zILð1 zÞn1Vþ ð1 zILÞð1 zÞn1p
dz2IL
2
 F;
given the above equilibrium expressions for z and n(zIL). In particular, solving (4) for
(1  z)n1V = dz(1  z)/(1  zIL), using z ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F=V
p
, and substituting in the expected
proﬁts of the incumbent leader, we have
PI ¼ d
zIL
1 zIL
þ p
V
  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r
1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r !
 z
2
IL
2
" #
 F:
Evaluating the derivative with respect to zIL at zIL = z, we obtain
@PI
@zIL
¼ d 1ð1 zÞ2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r
1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r !
 z
" #
¼ 2F
1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2F=dp [ 0;
which shows that it is always optimal for the incumbent leader to increase the rate of
investment beyond that of the followers. However, the optimal strategy may be an inte-
rior solution or a corner solution.
The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution is
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r
1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2F
d
r !
¼ zILð1 zILÞ2;
and the second-order condition is satisﬁed only for zIL < 1/3. For a suﬃciently small
ﬁxed cost, entry deterrence is too costly and the interior solution characterizes the equilib-
rium: the smallest root of this cubic equation provides the equilibrium investment of the
incumbent leader. Therefore when the ﬁxed cost of entry is small enough, the incumbent
leader does not deter entry, but invests more than any outsider. Contrary to the entry
deterrence rationale for innovation by leaders advanced by Gilbert and Newbery
(1982),12 here both leaders and outsiders invest in R&D, but leaders invest more.
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Of course, when the ﬁxed entry cost is high enough, entry deterrence can be optimal.
In particular, when F is large enough and/or V is small enough, the expected proﬁts are
always increasing in the investment of the leader in the relevant range, and we have a cor-
ner solution such that no outsider enters. The entry-deterring investment of the incum-
bent leader is
zIL ¼ 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p
V
;
which is larger than z under our assumption V [
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dF
p
=ð1  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2F=dp Þ. Therefore in all
cases the incumbent leader invests more than any outsider.
When the incumbent monopolist is the leader in the competition for the innovation,
the Arrow eﬀect disappears, because the choice of the monopolist is independent of the
current proﬁts.13 Notice that the entry deterring rate of investment of the leader is
increasing in the expected ﬂow of proﬁts V (more expected proﬁts require a larger invest-
ment to deter entry of the outsiders). Moreover, the investment is still decreasing in d,
and is now decreasing in the ﬁxed cost of entry of the other ﬁrms (which reduces the
investment needed to deter entry). The intuition for the larger investment of the incum-
bent leader has to do with the impact of its investment on entry: a small investment
attracts large entry and makes it likely that another ﬁrm will replace the incumbent, while
a commitment to a large investment has the double advantage of reducing entry and
reducing the chances of an innovation by others.
The interest of this result emerges when we compare it to the case in which the incum-
bent has no ﬁrst mover advantage. In such a case, the standard Arrow eﬀect leads to the
opposite result: the incumbent does not invest at all, and only the outsiders invest and
possibly innovate. Summing up, there are two conditions under which a ﬁrm always
invests more than others in R&D: (1) this ﬁrm is the incumbent leader; (2) there is an
endogenous entry threat in the market.
The main empirical predictions of our simple contest are not model-speciﬁc, and they
can be found in other general models of investment in R&D. To convince the reader of
this, we will brieﬂy provide a couple of examples.
A general patent race
A wide literature on R&D investments (started by Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980)14 has stud-
ied patent races where the rate of investment zi generates innovations according to a Pois-
son process with an arrival rate given by a function h(zi) eventually exhibiting decreasing
returns to scale, so that the expected value of innovating for an average ﬁrm is h(zi)V/
[r + ∑h(zj)], where r is the interest rate. In such a case, one can verify that entry always
reduces the investment of the average ﬁrm (this is due to strategic substitutability), and
Etro (2004, 2008) has shown that when entry is endogenous, the incumbent leader always
invests more than any other single ﬁrm. In case of linear variable costs of investment dzi,
the ﬁrst-order conditions for the rate of investment of the average ﬁrm z and of the
incumbent leader zIL, and the endogenous entry condition, lead to the following equilib-
rium equations (Etro 2008):
h0ðzÞV F z
V
¼ h0ðzILÞ ¼
dhðzÞ
zþ F :
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From these conditions one can verify that zIL > z. Such an outcome conﬁrms the valid-
ity of the main empirical predictions of our basic model.
Strategic investment in R&D
Similar results have been developed in models of R&D spending as a strategic investment
preliminary to the competition in the market. In these models, R&D spending per ﬁrm is
typically decreasing with the number of ﬁrms because more competition reduces proﬁts
and sales, which reduces the incentives to invest: this conﬁrms our earlier results on the
negative relation between entry and investment. Moreover, the investment of the incum-
bent leaders can be radically diﬀerent according to whether or not entry is endogenous.
In models of competition in prices, Etro (2006) has shown that market leaders should
spend less than the other ﬁrms in R&D investments in cost reductions when the number
of ﬁrms is exogenous, but they should spend more when entry is endogenous. Under com-
petition in quantities, the leader would generally spend more than the followers on cost
reductions under both entry conditions; nevertheless, also in such a case, an incumbent
facing endogenous entry would invest more when it has a ﬁrst mover advantage, not only
in absolute amount but also relative to revenue. To verify the last result, let us brieﬂy con-
sider a model of Cournot competition with inverse demand p = a  X. All ﬁrms have a
constant marginal cost c except the incumbent, which can invest k in R&D to reduce its
marginal cost to cðkÞ ¼ c  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃk=dp , with d > 1.
In a symmetric equilibrium for the choice of investment k and production xI for the
incumbent and x for the other ﬁrms, one can verify that R&D investment decreases with
the number of ﬁrms. When entry is endogenous, the equilibrium price is p ¼ c þ ﬃﬃﬃFp ,
and the incumbent invests k = dF/(2d  1)2 and produces xI ¼ 2d
ﬃﬃﬃ
F
p
=ð2d  1Þ [ x ¼ﬃﬃﬃ
F
p
. The rate of investment zI = R&D/sales = k/pxI can be calculated as follows:
zI ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
F
p
2ð2d 1Þðcþ ﬃﬃﬃFp Þ :
When the incumbent can precommit to an investment in R&D, it will choose a larger
investment k = dF/(d  1)2 without aﬀecting the equilibrium price, but expanding its
own production xI ¼ d
ﬃﬃﬃ
F
p
=ðd  1Þ and reducing the number of entrants. The equilib-
rium rate of investment becomes
zIL ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
F
p
ðd 1Þðcþ ﬃﬃﬃFp Þ ;
which satisﬁes zIL > zI. It is remarkable that this result is now presented in terms of the
R&D/sales ratio, which is exactly the dependent variable used in our empirical analysis.
More generally, as shown also by Maci and Zigic (2011) and Kovac et al. (2010), the
leadership always generates strategic overinvestment in R&D relative to sales when entry
is endogenous.
Testable predictions
Our overview of simple and general theoretical models of the incentives to invest in R&D
emphasizes two conclusions that appear robust to alternative modelling speciﬁcations.
They can be summarized as follows.
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Hypothesis 1. R&D intensity of the average ﬁrm decreases with entry and is lower when
there is an endogenous entry threat compared to when there is not.
Hypothesis 2. R&D intensity of the incumbent leader is larger than the investment of the
average ﬁrm when there is an endogenous entry threat.
The ﬁrst hypothesis suggests a negative relation between the threat of entry perceived
by the ﬁrms and their rate of investment in R&D, and it derives from the strengthening of
competition for the market induced by entry. The second hypothesis is our main interest
because it is in radical contrast with the Arrow view of the incumbents as ﬁrms investing
less than the other ﬁrms in R&D. According to our models, these incumbents should
invest more than the other ﬁrms if they are leaders and face a strong threat of entry pres-
sure.
II. EMPIRICAL TEST
In this section, we perform an empirical test on whether actual ﬁrm-level investment data
support our hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework.
Data sources
We use data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) from the year 2005. This inno-
vation survey has been conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW), Mannheim. The ZEW has conducted the survey since 1992, and it represents the
German part of the EU-wide harmonized Community Innovation Survey (CIS). It fol-
lows the Eurostat/OECD guidelines for collecting innovation data, which are docu-
mented in the so-called Oslo Manual (see OECD and Eurostat 1997). Readers not
familiar with the survey are referred to the summary reports, e.g. Eurostat (2004, 2008).
The MIP data constitute a representative sample of the German manufacturing sector as
well as business-related services. For our study, we focus on the manufacturing sector.
The 2005 spell of the MIP included some unique questions allowing us to model entry
threats and to identify leaders.
The database has a cross-sectional structure, but the questionnaire collects informa-
tion generally for the years 2002 to 2004. The quantitative variables, such as R&D invest-
ment, capital, employment, sales, etc., are surveyed for a certain year. For instance, R&D
investment is collected only for the year 2004. Other information that we use as controls
are, however, collected for the two years 2003 and 2004, so that we can make use of
lagged controls to avoid direct simultaneity bias in the regressions. Qualitative informa-
tion, such as the competitive situation in a ﬁrm’s main market, the ﬁrm’s competitive
position, etc., are collected through one question each referring to the time period 2002–
4. We will use the qualitative information to construct variables on incumbency and entry
threats during this period, and argue that the situation between 2002 and 2004 will have
an impact on strategic investment behaviour in 2004.
The dependent variable of our analysis is the R&D intensity in the year 2004 at the
ﬁrm level. The intensity is deﬁned as RDINTi = R&Di/SALESi9100.
The most important right-hand side variables are the entry threat and the leadership
position. An innovative aspect of our empirical approach is given by the fact that the
same ﬁrms provide a subjective view on these two factors: rather than assigning a degree
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of entry intensity in a discretionary way or assigning a status of leadership on the basis of
arbitrary variables, we allow the ﬁrms to identify the existence of an endogenous threat
of entry in the market and the identity of the leader in the market.
The survey asked for several characteristics about the competitive situation in ﬁrms’
main product markets in the time period 2002–4. In particular, ﬁrms were asked to indi-
cate if a list of six statements about the ﬁrms competitive environment apply to their situ-
ation or not. The response was based on a four-point Likert scale, from ‘applies strongly’
to ‘does not apply at all’. One of those six statements considered entry pressure, and was
phrased as follows: ‘Position in the market is highly threatened by entry of new competi-
tors’. Thus our variable of entry threat, ENTRYi, is an ordinal variable taking values
from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates that the respondent ﬁrm strongly agreed with the statement
that its market position is highly threatened by entry. When this is the case, we conjecture
that entry in the industry where the ﬁrm is active can be regarded as endogenous; when
the ﬁrm does not consider the threat of entry as present in its industry, this is regarded as
one with an exogenous number of ﬁrms. As found in the theoretical framework (Hypoth-
esis 1), we expect a negative sign of ENTRYi in the regressions for the average R&D
intensity.
The theoretical deﬁnition of a market leader is associated with a strategic ﬁrst mover
advantage, but a more general deﬁnition can be based on the leading strategic position of
the ﬁrm compared to its main competitors. Therefore our incumbent variable is deﬁned
through a question on a ﬁrms’ position compared to its main competitors. The respon-
dents indicated if their competitors in their main market are larger, smaller, similar size,
or larger and smaller than their ﬁrm.15 An incumbent leader in our analysis is identiﬁed
by an indicator variable LEADERi describing a ﬁrm that perceives itself as larger than
the competitors in its main product market. The main advantage of this survey informa-
tion is that the ﬁrms themselves identify their relevant market. Therefore it is irrelevant
whether the company is only domestically or also internationally active. The companies’
managers have to assess their main competitors, whoever they are and wherever they
come from. This would not be possible if, for instance, a concentration index or market
share data were used, as such information is typically available only at national levels.
While we expect that entry has a negative impact on the investment of each single
ﬁrm, the theoretical framework shows that leaders choose to invest more than other con-
testants if their market is threatened by entry (Hypothesis 2). We capture this by an inter-
action term of leadership and entry (LEADERi9ENTRYi).
As outlined in the theoretical model, it is desirable to control for employment and
capital requirement. We include ﬁrms’ employment in t  1 (EMPi,t1) as well as capital
intensity (KAPINTi,t1) measured as ﬁxed assets divided by employment in the empirical
model to account for such impacts on investment decision. For the size of the employ-
ment we expect a positive and concave relation on the basis of our theoretical work.
Concerning the role of capital intensity, we do not have strong priors on the sign of the
coeﬃcient. We also control for the Herﬁndahl index (HHI) of concentration of the
industry where the ﬁrm is active (HHIi,t1). These data are obtained from the German
Monopolies Commission, which biannually publishes the oﬃcial German industry con-
centration statistics.16 The Herﬁndahl index accounts for domestic market structure. We
also use the lagged import ratio at the industry level to control for competitive pressure
from abroad (IMPORTi,t1 = importsi,t1/(importsi,t1 + domestic productioni,t1)).
In addition, we control for some other factors that might inﬂuence ﬁrms’ R&D
investment. For example, diﬀerent corporate governance structures may have an eﬀect
on the dependent variable either through the access to capital or through heterogeneity in
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management objectives. We use a dummy variable GROUPi, indicating whether a ﬁrm is
associated with a group of companies. Such ﬁrms might have better access to capital
through the parent company and thus may innovate more than stand-alone companies.
In addition, we take into account whether the parent company is a foreign enterprise
(FOREIGNi).
Among others, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Acemoglu and Linn (2004) suggest
that eﬀorts to innovate increase with market size. Therefore we also control for the size of
the market by using the total sales volume at the three-digit NACE industry level (MAR-
KETSIZEi,t1). These data were also obtained from the German Monopolies Commis-
sion. We use the lag of market size in the regressions to avoid a simultaneity bias.
Finally, we use 14 industry dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity in
investment across industries. The industries are Food, Textiles/Leather, Paper/Wood/
Furniture, Publishing/Printing, Chemicals, Rubber, Glass/Ceramics, Metal Production,
Metal Products, Machinery, Electronics, Information & Communication Technology,
Instruments/Optics and Vehicles. The list of controls is complemented by state dummies.
Germany is divided into 16 states, the ‘L€ander’. As some of those are very small, we
aggregated them into 12 diﬀerent regions.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of core variables used in the upcoming regres-
sion analysis. In total, our sample consists of 1857 ﬁrm-level observations. The average
R&D intensity of ﬁrms is about 2.3%, and average ﬁrm size amounts to 307 employees in
the sample. 8% of all ﬁrms are classiﬁed as incumbent leaders.
Patent stocks, intellectual property rights and unobserved firm heterogeneity
A main determinant of the investment in R&D is the degree of protection of the intellec-
tual property (IP) rights associated with the innovations that each ﬁrm can obtain. It is
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
RDINTit 2.204 5.015 0 38.914
EMPi,t1/1000 0.298 1.237 0.001 36.761
KAPINTi,t1 0.078 0.090 0.001 0.861
LEADERit 0.080 0.271 0 1
ENTRYit 1.537 0.851 0 3
HHIi,t191000 36.778 61.022 3.15 650.17
PSTOCKi,t1/(EMPi,t1/1000) 8.864 26.906 0 222.447
IPPROTECTIONit 0.201 0.401 0 1
GROUPit 0.602 0.489 0 1
FOREIGNit 0.112 0.315 0 1
IMPORTi,t1 0.226 0.121 0 1
ln (MSIZE)i,t1 10.216 0.995 4.620 11.792
IV candidates
MESt1 0.079 0.166 0.009 2.102
NEWKAPit 0.015 0.013 0.001 0.134
DMATPRICE%it 0.064 0.278 3.082 5.556
Notes
1857 observations. Industry dummies and region dummies omitted.
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diﬃcult to measure the degree of protection of the intellectual property rights at the ﬁrm
level, but we can proxy this with two measures.
First, we use stock of patents at the ﬁrm level. In particular, the diﬀerences between
ﬁrms in the size of the patent portfolio can be associated with the diﬀerences in the degree
of expected protection of the innovations of the ﬁrms, therefore we expect a positive cor-
relation between R&D intensity and the patent stock. Moreover, the introduction of this
important control variable allows us to obtain a robustness check that might account for
unobserved heterogeneity even in the absence of panel data, as the number of patents
taken out in the past should also proxy past R&D eﬀorts.
Our measure of the patent stock at the ﬁrm level accounts for all patent applications
from 1978 onwards. In particular, we compute the patent stock using the perpetual inven-
tory method for each ﬁrm. The survey data has been merged with the database from the
German Patent Oﬃce, which covers all patents ﬁled at both the German and the Euro-
pean Patent Oﬃce since 1978. We follow the common practice in the literature and
impose a rate of obsolescence of 15% per year when computing the patent stock (see, for
example, Griliches and Mairesse 1984). Including such a rate of obsolescence implies,
quite realistically, that knowledge loses its relevance similarly as capital depreciates over
time. The variable PSTOCK is given by
PSTOCKit ¼ ð1 dÞPSTOCKi;t1 þ PAit;
where d = 0.15, and PAit denotes patent applications of ﬁrm i in year t. We set the initial
patent stock in year 1978 to zero for all ﬁrms. Since we use data from 2002–4 in our
regressions, the bias arising from a zero starting value will have disappeared due to the
included depreciation rate d.
Second, we use a variable reﬂecting the appropriability conditions in the industry. In
the survey, ﬁrms were asked to what extent patents are an important tool for protecting
intellectual property in their business. We create a dummy variable IPPROTECTIONit
that takes unit value if the ﬁrm rated patents as highly important in their industry. This
should capture the appropriability conditions in the ﬁrm’s main market, and we expect
that the estimated coeﬃcient will be positive, that is, it reﬂects higher incentives for con-
ducting R&D.
Potential reverse causality between R&D and entry threat
In our empirical investigation, we proxy the threat of entry in the market where each ﬁrm
is active with the perception of the ﬁrm as collected in our survey data. This avoids an
arbitrary decision on whether a market is characterized by endogenous entry as opposed
to being limited to an exogenous number of ﬁrms. A possible concern of our approach
relies in the independence of our entry variable from the dependent variable, R&D inten-
sity. Reverse causality could aﬀect our results: in principle, it is possible that current
R&D leading to a future technological advantage makes ﬁrms perceive the entry threat
as less severe, while on the other hand, if ﬁrms are not research active and neglect the
development of new processes and products, entry may appear as a quite realistic threat.
To test the possibility of a reverse relationship, we experimented with a number of candi-
dates for instrumental variables as outlined in the following paragraphs.
To ﬁnd instrumental variables that explain our entry variable but not the R&D inten-
sity variable, we need to look at the key element determining entry pressure, the diﬀerence
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between the expected gross proﬁts in the market and the ﬁxed costs of entry. There is a
well-developed theoretical and empirical literature on the so-called barriers to entry. The
empirical studies on entry barriers address the question of natural barriers, like sunk costs
of entry determining scale economies, and on the other side strategic barriers, for instance
excess capacity, limit pricing, product diﬀerentiation and innovative activity.
It is not simple to ﬁnd a measure of the ﬁxed costs of entry. Sutton (1998) uses the size
of the median plant in an industry as a proxy for minimum eﬃcient scale, and therefore
for the size of the costs of entry. In other studies, variants of size measures are used, but
most studies rely on observed size as it is very diﬃcult to get information on the minimum
eﬃcient size required by the technology used.17 We have information on total industry
sales and the number of ﬁrms active in an industry. This information is taken from oﬃcial
statistics and measured at a detailed industry level (NACE three-digit level).18 The ratio,
industry sales per ﬁrm is applied as a proxy for minimum eﬃcient scale and enters the
regressions as a lagged value (MESt1).
Furthermore, we use another proxy for sunk cost of entry that has been suggested by
Gschwandtner and Lambson (2012). This variable is the amount of new capital expendi-
ture (investment) per employee in the industry (denoted by NEWKAPit). Gschwandtner
and Lambson (2012) argue that the higher the new capital by ﬁrms in an industry, the
higher the (unobserved) sunk costs are to be expected. Thus we would presume a negative
relationship between this variable and entry. We compute this measure at the three-digit
NACE industry level. We expect this instrument to be relevant and also exogenous in our
model, as the expected sunk cost occurring when entering an industry should not depend
on an individual ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀorts.
Another factor that can aﬀect proﬁtability and entry is changes in production cost in
an industry, as entry decisions are likely to be aﬀected by cost conditions and in particu-
lar by recent changes. If, for some reason, cost increases get large and production condi-
tions worsen, prices will in most cases increase, and this in turn leads to lower demand. In
such a situation entry is unattractive. Consequently, we consider cost of raw and interme-
diate materials as a candidate for an instrumental variable explaining entry. As we do not
have access to a price indicator at the industry level concerning material input, we com-
pute the statistic below from our sample ﬁrms and aggregate it to the industry level. We
use the change in material cost spent per employee over time at the industry level. Thus
this measure proxies the changes in material cost required per workplace in the produc-
tion process. The variable at the ﬁrm level is computed as
DMAT PRICE%it ¼
Material Exp/Emplit Material Exp/Empli;t1
Material Exp/Empli;t1
 100:
This measure is then averaged at the three-digit NACE industry level. If input relations
regarding material and employment remain constant over the two included periods, this
is equivalent to changes in material prices. Increasing costs are, of course, expected to dis-
courage entry. Again, we expect that this measure is also exogenous in our model as a
ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀorts should not aﬀect the change in material prices at the industry level.
Econometric analysis
As not all ﬁrms invest in R&D, we estimate Tobit models that take account of the left
censoring of the dependent variable. The Tobit model to be estimated can be written as
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RDINTi ¼ Xibþ ei;
where RDINTi is the unobserved latent variable. The observed dependent variable is
equal to
RDINTi ¼ RDINT

i if X
0
ibþ ei[ 0,
0 otherwise.

Xi represents the matrix of regressors, b represents the parameters to be estimated, and
ei represents the random error term. In our basic speciﬁcation, Xi includes EMPi,t1,
EMP2i;t1, KAPINTi,t1, LEADERit and ENTRYit, as well as 13 industry dummies. In
further models, we add the interaction term LEADERit9ENTRYit and PSTOCKit to
control for further heterogeneity.
We ﬁrst consider homoscedastic regressions, and subsequently test for heteroscedas-
ticity as coeﬃcient estimates may be inconsistent if the assumption of homoscedasticity is
violated in Tobit models. In order to estimate heteroscedastic Tobits, the homoscedastic
variance r is replaced with ri ¼ r expðZ0iaÞ in the likelihood function (see Greene 2003,
pp. 768–9). We consider groupwise multiplicative heteroscedasticity by using a set of ﬁve
size dummies (based on employment) and the industry dummies in the heteroscedasticity
term.
Tables 2 and 3 show the regression results for homoscedastic and heteroscedastic
models, respectively. In the homoscedastic Tobit Model I, we ﬁnd that R&D investment
decreases as the threat of entry increases. The leaders’ investment does not diﬀer from
that of the outsiders. When we add the interaction term of leadership and entry threat
(see Model II), however, interesting diﬀerences occur. While the leader dummy is still
insigniﬁcant, we now ﬁnd that leaders who are faced by potential entry invest more than
outsiders.
The results remain robust when we control for prior R&D using the patent stock and
also for the appropriability conditions in the industry (Model III). Both the patent stock
and the dummy on IP protection are highly signiﬁcant and positive, conﬁrming that ﬁrms
receiving stronger protection of IP rights through patents tend to invest more, and ﬁrms
that (successfully) conducted R&D in the past as reﬂected by the patent stock will also
invest more in the current period. One could also read this result as contradicting the view
for which ﬁrms with a lot of patents would be less innovative and use their patent portfo-
lio to jeopardize further investments in R&D.
With respect to the other covariates, we ﬁnd a positive and concave relation with
employment,19 while capital intensity and the Herﬁndahl index are not signiﬁcant. The
results on corporate governance structure and on imports are mixed. The group dummy
is positively signiﬁcant, which could reﬂect that ﬁrms associated with groups are less
ﬁnancially constrained than stand-alone companies. The dummy indicating foreign par-
ent companies is insigniﬁcant. The imports are positively signiﬁcant, which tells us that
ﬁrms in industries characterized by high import penetration undertake on average more
R&D eﬀorts. Furthermore, there are diﬀerences in R&D investment across industries.
The industry dummies are always jointly diﬀerent from zero in the regressions, and our
results emphasize a high correlation of R&D spending with ﬁrms of the Information &
Communication Technology industry. The region dummies also suggest unobserved het-
erogeneity across states, but these results become insigniﬁcant in the heteroscedastic
regressions below. The control for market size is always insigniﬁcant.
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As Table 3 shows, the assumption of homoscedasticity is rejected for all models (see
Wald tests on heteroscedasticity). The industry and ﬁrm size dummies are always jointly
signiﬁcant in the variance equation. However, our main results are robust to the model
modiﬁcation. Leaders, in general, are still not investing in R&D diﬀerently to the outsid-
ers, and R&D investment is negatively aﬀected by the entry variable. Leaders that suﬀer
from entry threat also invest more than outsiders in the heteroscedastic version. There
are no dramatic changes in the estimates of the other covariates. The patent stock is still
highly positively signiﬁcant, and the estimated employment eﬀect remains stable.
To sum up, our ﬁndings on entry are in line with our Hypothesis 1, that is, investment
decreases with the strength of entry threats. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that incumbent leaders
do not diﬀer in their investment from other ﬁrms (LEADER is insigniﬁcant), unless they
are threatened by endogenous entry. Then the negative investment eﬀect is oﬀset (see the
TABLE 2
HOMOSCEDASTIC TOBIT MODELS ON R&D INTENSITY
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t1/1000 0.831*** 0.878*** 0.252
(0.273) (0.273) (0.273)
(EMPi,t1/1000)
2 0.021** 0.022** 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
KAPINTi,t1 3.265 3.187 2.818
(2.084) (2.082) (2.009)
HHIi,t1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PSTOCKi,t1 0.037***
(0.006)
IPPROTECTIONit 4.017***
(0.455)
LEADERit 0.101 0.154 0.142
(0.680) (0.679) (0.656)
ENTRYit 0.615*** 0.891*** 0.777***
(0.222) (0.246) (0.238)
ENTRYit9LEADERit 0.576*** 0.442**
(0.217) (0.210)
GROUPit 0.946** 0.942** 0.521
(0.406) (0.406) (0.392)
FOREIGNit 0.302 0.239 0.344
(0.590) (0.589) (0.571)
IMPORTi,t1 10.354* 10.593** 9.206*
(5.313) (5.307) (5.117)
MARKETSIZEi,t1 0.281 0.277 0.303
(0.245) (0.245) (0.236)
Intercept 5.265* 5.443* 4.647
(3.128) (3.127) (3.018)
Industry dummies v2(13) 250.39*** 246.58*** 162.08***
Region dummies v2(11) 23.66** 24.40** 27.20***
Log-likelihood 3749.23 3745.70 3676.50
Notes
1857 observations. Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, *indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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positive sign of the interaction term LEADERi9ENTRYi). Thus incumbents invest more
than the outsiders under endogenous entry threat. In line with our Hypothesis 2, the com-
petitive pressure of the potential entry of other ﬁrms induces the market leaders to invest
in R&Dmore than any other ﬁrm.
In economic terms, the ﬁndings are also highly signiﬁcant. Calculating the expected
value of RDINTi for outsiders under no entry threat yields
20
EðRDINTijLEADERi ¼ 0;ENTRYi ¼ 0; XiÞ ¼ 0:81;
where the covariates are taken at the average Xi.
21 In contrast, the investment intensity of
outsiders under high entry threat only amounts to
TABLE 3
HETEROSCEDASTIC TOBIT MODELS ON R&D INTENSITY
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t1/1000 0.536*** 0.560*** 0.333***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.108)
(EMPi,t1/1000)
2 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
KAPINTi,t1 0.526 0.516 1.119
(0.920) (0.926) (0.934)
HHIi,t1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
PSTOCKi,t1 0.019***
(0.005)
IPPROTECTIONit 2.080***
(0.253)
LEADERit 0.125 0.118 0.054
(0.266) (0.264) (0.271)
ENTRYit 0.196 0.321** 0.273**
(0.120) (0.132) (0.131)
ENTRYit*LEADERit 0.308*** 0.270**
(0.119) (0.120)
GROUPit 0.919*** 0.936*** 0.705***
(0.243) (0.243) (0.246)
FOREIGNit 0.537** 0.494* 0.103
(0.271) (0.270) (0.262)
IMPORTi,t1 8.160** 8.262** 8.152**
(4.001) (3.969) (3.858)
MARKETSIZEi,t1 0.233* 0.223 0.169
(0.133) (0.133) (0.135)
Intercept 0.912 1.173 1.872
(1.607) (1.610) (1.656)
Industry dummies v2(12) 127.10*** 127.85*** 86.68***
Region dummies v2(11) 13.03 12.99 11.81
Log-likelihood 3509.37 3505.95 3451.55
Wald test on heteroscedasticity v2(17) 535.45*** 531.96*** 496.55***
Notes
1857 observations. Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, *indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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EðRDINTijLEADERi ¼ 0; ENTRYi ¼ 3; XiÞ ¼ 0:42;
which means that R&D intensity reduces by about 52%, all else constant. If a leader suf-
fers from high entry threat, however, we obtain
EðRDINTijLEADERi ¼ 1; ENTRYi ¼ 3; XiÞ ¼ 0:78;
which corresponds to an about 90% higher investment for the leaders of markets with
endogenous entry compared to their followers.22
Results on reverse causality between R&D and entry
In this subsection we verify whether there is a problem of reverse causality for which high
R&D intensity of a generic ﬁrm induces low entry threat, and vice versa.
First, we test if the above mentioned instrumental variables are relevant in the ﬁrst-
stage regression of entry on all covariates and the excluded instruments. Table 4 shows
the partial F-values for the instrumental variables in the ﬁrst-stage regression.
Then we test for reverse causality in the second-stage regression following Smith and
Blundell (1986). They introduced a regression-based test that is basically equivalent to
the procedure suggested by Hausman (1978, 1983) for the OLS case.23 Suppose that our
R&D investment equation is given by
yi1 ¼ x0ibþ ayi2 þ ui;
where the possibly endogenous regressor y2 is the entry threat in our case, and the vector
xi denotes the other regressors. Then we write the reduced form equation for y2 as
yi2 ¼ z0ipþ vi;ð7Þ
where z0i contains the vector x and the other instrumental variables described above. Once
we estimate (7) and obtain v^i, we can estimate our R&D equation including the generated
residuals from the ﬁrst-stage regression using Tobit as
yi1 ¼ x0ibþ ayi2 þ qv^i þ ei:
TABLE 4
IV RELEVANCE TESTS AND ENDOGENEITY TEST OF ENTRY VARIABLE
Test MESt1 MESt1,NEWKAPt
MESt1,
NEWKAPt,DMAT%t
F-test on IV signiﬁcance in
ﬁrst-stage regression
F = 10.84*** F = 9.79*** F=8.68***
Blundell–Smith endogeneity testa 0.496 0.882 1.509
Exogeneity testb — 0.002 3.494
Notes
***, **, *indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
aBased on heteroscedastic Model I. t-statistics of ﬁrst-stage residuals are displayed.
bAmemiya–Lee–Newey minimum v2 statistic (see Newey 1987; Lee 1992; Baum et al. 1999).
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The usual t-statistic of q^ is a valid test on the endogeneity of y2. If it is not rejected that
q^ ¼ 0, we do not ﬁnd that yi2 is explained yi1.
Table 4 reports the IV relevance tests from the ﬁrst-stage regression (partial F-statis-
tics), and the Smith–Blundell test on endogeneity of ENTRY (where endogeneity here is
in the econometric sense) based on the heteroscedastic regressions of Model I (the homo-
scedastic version led to the same conclusions).
Staiger and Stock (1997) emphasized that the ﬁrst-stage signiﬁcance levels of the
instrumental variables may be misleading, as they do not necessarily exclude a weak
instrument problem, which would lead to considerable bias in IV regressions. Instead of
interpreting the signiﬁcance level, they argue—as rule of thumb—that the partial F-statis-
tic should be around 10 in the case of a single endogenous regressor, to conﬁdently rule
out weak instruments. As can be seen in Table 4, all F-values are around 10, and conse-
quently we should not be concerned about a weak instrument bias.
Furthermore, we test whether the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the
error term in our structural equation. Only if we are conﬁdent of having no weak
instrument problem, and the instruments are not correlated with the error term in theR&D
equation, we can rely on our IV results. Aswe estimate Tobitmodels, we use theAmemiya–
Lee–Neweyminimum v2 statistic to test for the exogeneity of our instruments.24
As a ﬁnal step, we test for endogeneity of ENTRY using the Smith–Blundell test. As
the results in Table 4 show, the exogeneity of ENTRY with respect to R&D investment is
not rejected. The corresponding regression results for the ﬁrst stage of the IV procedure
are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
In summary, we found relevant instrumental variables, but the potential reverse cau-
sality has been rejected by the tests. Given these results, we conclude that the results as
presented in Table 3 still hold, and that our two main hypothesis are thus conﬁrmed:
R&D investment decreases with larger entry threats in general, but leaders invest more
into R&D when threatened by entry.
In addition to the feedback eﬀect from R&D to entry, some readers may be concerned
about the feedback from R&D to our variable LEADER. We simply checked if past
R&D intensity (which we have for a subsample of about 1000 companies) determines our
leadership variable to a certain extent. For this, we simply regressed LEADER on past
R&D intensity, past sales and industry dummies. It turns out that past sales, and thus
past ﬁrm size, dominate the relationship. There is no additional eﬀect of past R&D
beyond ﬁrm size.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Who does invest in R&D? This paper has provided theoretical and empirical motivations
for a relatively surprising answer to this question: market leaders do invest in R&D more
than other ﬁrms when they are under the competitive pressure of endogenous entrants,
while they appear to invest as the other ﬁrms in markets with barriers to entry. The imme-
diate consequence is that under endogenous entry, incumbents are more likely to inno-
vate and therefore to persist in their leading position, while incumbents that do not face
entry pressure tend to be less innovative (and therefore tend to be replaced). This result
suggests that we may have to change our way of looking at persistent dominance in a
technologically advanced market: this may be the result of strong competitive pressures.
A novel aspect of our empirical approach is given by the fact that the same ﬁrms pro-
vide a subjective view on our key determinants of R&D intensity, the entry pressure and
the leadership. Rather than determining arbitrarily the size and composition of a market,
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assigning a degree of entry intensity in a discretionary way and assigning a status of lead-
ership on the basis of predetermined variables, using the questionnaire of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel, we allow the ﬁrms to identify the size of their main market, the exis-
tence of an endogenous threat of entry in the market and the identity of the leader in the
market.
Our empirical approach can be seen as a ﬁrst attempt to test the predictions of the
endogenous market structures approach and could be applied to other empirical implica-
tions, for instance, on on the role of leaders in pricing strategies, preliminary investment
decisions (capacity building or advertising), contractual strategies (such as vertical
contracts, bundling decisions, incentives contracts for managers and workers), ﬁnancial
decisions, and so on.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION BY INDUSTRY AGGREGATES
Industry
No. of
observations
No. of
leaders
Average R&D
intensity (%)
Food 121 13 0.33
Textiles/Leather 97 9 1.21
Paper/Wood 189 11 0.85
Publishing/Printing 117 12 0.54
Chemicals 132 6 3.50
Rubber 138 9 1.16
Glass/Ceramics 82 11 0.93
Metal production 61 5 0.63
Metal fabrication 259 22 1.09
Machinery 222 23 2.68
Electronics 109 7 2.51
ICT 70 3 5.65
Instruments/Optics 172 14 7.10
Vehicles 88 4 2.37
Total 1857 149
TABLE A2
IV FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS ON ENTRY
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t1/1000 0.049 0.046 0.047
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
(EMPi,t1/1000)
2 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
KAPINTi,t1 0.106 0.152 0.150
(0.243) (0.242) (0.241)
HHIi,t1 0.00003 0.00006 0.00005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
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TABLE A2
CONTINUED
Variables Model I Model II Model III
LEADERit 0.229*** 0.239*** 0.235***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
GROUPit 0.034 0.031 0.027***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
FOREIGNit 0.122* 0.115 0.113
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
IMPORTi,t1 0.519 0.978* 0.755
(0.560) (0.579) (0.585)
MARKETSIZEi,t1 0.005 0.001 0.010
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
PSTOCKi,t1 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IPPROTECTIONit 0.010 0.018 0.016
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
MESi,t1 0.327*** 0.311*** 0.325***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100)
NEWKAPit -5.144*** 4.581***
(1.667) (1.698)
DMAT%it 0.219**
(0.089)
Intercept 1.699*** 1.790*** 1.666***
(0.309) (0.315) (0.317)
F-test industry dummies 2.53*** 2.84*** 3.04***
F-test region dummies 0.59 0.57 0.58**
F-test IVs 10.84*** 9.79*** 8.68***
Notes
1857 observations. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** , **, *indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
‘F-test IVs’ refers to a joint signiﬁcance test of our instrumental variables, which areMES in Model I,MES and
NEWKAP in Model II, andMES,NEWKAP and DMAT% inModel III.
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NOTES
1. Moreover, taking this view literally, we should conclude that whenever we observe monopoly persistence,
it is because the incumbent ﬁrm is more eﬃcient than the other ﬁrms at both producing and innovating.
There are many sectors in which incumbents do not appear to have any cost advantage in the development
of innovations compared to outsiders, and still both the incumbents and the entrants keep investing.
2. See Sutton (1998, 2007) and Etro (2007) for reviews of this literature.
3. Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch. 14) have forcefully advanced an ‘escape competition’ rationale for invest-
ment by incumbents under entry, but their models rely on the assumption that a single incumbent faces an
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exogenous probability of entry (or an endogenous probability that a single rival may replace its leadership).
Under endogenous entry of outsiders, their incumbent would not invest as usual as a consequence of the
Arrow eﬀect (and the escape competition eﬀect would disappear as well).
4. As noticed by a referee, the empirical results provide evidence for a more general class of theories, namely
those based on endogenous market structures, in which market leaders behave diﬀerently from the other
ﬁrms, always in an aggressive way. Here we focus on R&D, but one can see this as a ﬁrst attempt to test the
recent models of endogenous market structures.
5. Aghion et al. (2009) provide additional empirical evidence on the impact of entry on incumbents’ invest-
ments. For an alternative empirical investigation of the same result, see Adams and Clemmons (2008).
6. One can think of the strength of intellectual property rights protection and of the importance of patents as
the determinants of the expected prize V. The assumption of a drastic innovation is not crucial for our
results, as in the model of Gilbert and Newbery (1982), which considers a contest with certainty (basically
an auction for a patent) and ignores risk in the R&D investment. See Etro (2004, Sec. 2.2) on the case of
non-drastic innovations in patent races with uncertainty.
7. The assumption of quadratic costs could be replaced with any convex cost function without altering the nat-
ure of the following results. Its role is only to provide closed forms solutions at least for the equilibria with
endogenous market structure.
8. Indeed, Πi = dz
2/2F, where z is decreasing in n, and z?0 for n?∞. Notice also that the probability that
someone innovates is Pr(Inn) = 1(1z)n = 1  z(1  z)d/V.
9. When the ﬁxed costs tend to zero, each ﬁrm tends to invest an inﬁnitesimal amount, but the number of ﬁrms
grows unboundedly; this reproduces a perfectly competitive outcome where the innovation is obtained for
sure, since Pr(Inn) = 1  (1  z)n?1.
10. Measuring welfare as Pr(Inn)V  ndz2/2  nF, the optimal investment rule is the same as in (1), but the
ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal number of ﬁrms is
log
1
1 z
 
ð1 zÞnV ¼ dz
2
2
þ F;
which requires always a lower number of ﬁrms than in equilibrium—indeed, log (1  z)1 < z/(1  z) for
any z ∈ (0,1). Of course, if the social value of innovation is higher than the private value, then we may have
too few ﬁrms in equilibrium.
11. Of course, in case of a high ﬁxed cost of entry, the incumbent may also ﬁnd it optimal to deter entry.
12. Gilbert and Newbery (1982, p. 521) brieﬂy analyse the case of uncertain contests, suggesting that entry
deterrence could also occur in that case: ‘The monopolist can guarantee negative expected proﬁts to any
potential entrant, and knowing this, ﬁrms would not invest in R&D… the monopolist has to set up the cor-
rect number of rival research teams—the same number of ﬁrms who would choose to enter under competi-
tive conditions’.
13. See De Bondt and Vandekerckhove (2008) for further extensions of this result to the case of R&D spillovers
between ﬁrms.
14. This stream of literature has been extended by Reinganum (1985) among many others.
15. Of course, whenever there is no ﬁrm in a market that perceives itself as larger than its competitors, the mar-
ket has no leader and competition is supposed to be symmetric.
16. Note that the HHI ranges between 0 and 1000 in the oﬃcial statistics, and not between 0 and 10,000 as is
commonly used in the USA.
17. Lyons et al. (2001) use engineering estimates based on the ﬁrms’ technologies employed in the production
process.
18. NACE is the European standard industry classiﬁcation, and the ﬁrms in our sample are active in 96 diﬀerent
NACE three-digit industries.
19. The inverted U curve peaks at about 20 thousand employees. As we have only a single observation that has
more employees, we can basically conclude that R&D investment is increasing and concave in ﬁrm size.
20. See Greene (2003, pp. 768–9) for the computation of the expected value in Tobit models.
21. Calculations are based on the heteroscedastic estimation of Model III.
22. Notice also that compared to the expected value of a ﬁrm in a market without entry threat, the investment
reduction by a leader due to entry is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
23. See also Wooldridge (2002, pp. 118–20).
24. See Amemiya (1978), Newey (1987), Lee (1992) and Baum et al. (1999).
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